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Lauren Smedley was an associate at the
law firm of Capps, Staples, Ward, Hastings & Dodson. She began working there
on April 4, 1990. She was discharged on
April 1, 1991, shortly after an article appeared in The Daily Journal, a legal newspaper in the San Francisco Bay area,
quoting Smedley about "being out" at
work in an article about the Bay Area
Lesbian Feminist Bar Association, an organization of which she was an officer.
According to Smedley, she had previously
received a note from one of the firm's
partners, stating that "given our clientele
it would not be appropriate to discuss
lesbian rights, groups, activities, etc," The
firm apparently found out she was a lesbian when an employee distributing
paychecks noticed a photograph of Smedley and her lesbian companion on Smedley's desk. The firm had never previously
knowingly employed a lesbian or gay attorney.
Had this all happened twenty years
ago, Smedley would have had no basis for
legal redress, for the law had barely begun
to address issues of sexual orientation and
the workplace. But in 1979, the California
Supreme Court ruled in Gay Law Students Association v. Pacific Telephone &
Telegraph Company^ that Section 1101
of the state's Labor Code, protecting Cali-

fornia employees from retaliation for their
political activities, should be interpreted
to protect lesbian and gay employees from
discrimination, California thus became
the first state in which lesbian and gay
employees would be protected as a matter
of state law, (The District of Columbia
had previously included "sexual orientation" in its employment discrimination
ordinance,^) After her discharge, Smedley
filed suit under a variety of legal theories,
including violation of Section 1101, Her
case is pending in the U,S, District Court
for the Northern District of California,^
In 1992, after two successive governors
vetoed attempts by the legislature to
amend California's Fair Employment and
Housing Code to make such protection
explicit, the legislature amended the Labor Code to codify the Gay Law Students
decision and make clear that it applied to
all California employers,"* By that time,
California was joining a growing list of
states expressly banning sexual orientation discrimination.
State Laws Proliferating
When California's Supreme Court first
ruled on the issue in 1979, a bare handful
of local ordinances and executive orders
protected lesbian and gay employees,
some applying only to the public sector.

' 24 Cal, 3d 458,156 Cal, Rptr, 14, 595 P,2d 592 (1979),
2 DC, Code Ann, Sec, l-2541(c)(1977),
^ Smedley v. Capps, Staples, Ward, Hastings & Dodson,
61 FEP 1360,1993 Westlaw 170409 (N,D, Cal, 1993),

•• See Cal, Lab, Code Sec, 1101,1102 and 1102,1(1992),
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The California ruling came at a time
when public attention to this issue was
being stirred by ballot measures seeking
repeal of local "gay rights" ordinances,
most prominently in Dade County, Florida, where singer Anita Bryant successfully led a religiously inspired repeal
crusade in 1977. Despite several such referendum setbacks, the movement to extend protection to lesbian and gay
employees was picking up steam at that
time, with several major cities passing
civil rights ordinances and the state of
Wisconsin becoming the first to legislate
on the subject in 1981.^
Then the epidemic of Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) hit the
gay community, and political efforts were
diverted to securing government funding
for treatment, research, and prevention
activities. Although activists continued
the struggle to pass local ordinances, less
effort was expended on statewide bills. In
1986, however, after the Supreme Court
ruled in Bowers v. Hardwick^ that the
constitutional right of privacy did not
prevent states from criminalizing homosexual intercourse, the gay rights movement was jolted into renewed political
action. State lobbying efforts were revived, and soon the pace of enactment of
state laws forbidding sexual orientation
discrimination picked up dramatically:
Massachusetts^ in 1989, Connecticut* and
Hawaii^ in 1991, California,1° New
Jersey," and Vermont'^ in 1992, and
Minnesota^^ early in 1993, with serious
legislative efforts pending in New York,
Rhode Island, and Washington State as
this was written in June 1993.
By June 1, 1993, approximately 23 percent of the United States population lived
in states (including the District of Columbia) where it was unlawful for employers
to discriminate on the basis of sexual ori5 Wise. Stat. Ann. Sec. 111.36(1981).
^478 U.S. 186(1986).
' Mass. Gen. Laws, Ch. 151B, Sec. 3(6) (1989).
8 Conn. Gen. Stat. Sec. 46a.81(c) (1991).
' Haw. Rev. Stat. Sec. 368-1, 378-2 (1991).
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entation as a matter of state law. Some of
those laws also extended to employers performing contracts for the state, and thus
might have extraterritorial impact.
In ten states (comprising about 40 percent of the population), sexual orientation
discrimination in state executive branch
employment was also forbidden by executive order of the governor. These states
include Colorado, Louisiana, Minnesota,
New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and Washington.
Local Laws Proliferating Even Faster
The increasing pace of enactment of
laws forbidding sexual orientation discrimination at the state level followed an
earlier trend of passage of such laws at the
local level. Shortly after the American
Psychiatric Association adopted its historic 1973 statement that homosexuality
was not a mental illness, lobbyists for
adding "sexual orientation" to local civil
rights ordinances began to achieve local
victories. Although there were some setbacks, beginning with the 1977 Dade
County referendum mentioned previously,
the pace of enactment of such laws accelerated sharply through the 1980s, and
now they are being passed at the rate of
one or more each month. Most are municipal ordinances, although in some cases
they are enacted by county governments.
Unfortunately, labor law reporting services do not systematically collect and
publish local laws, and treatises on employment discrimination either ignore
them or only mention those enacted by
the largest cities. Consequently, employers and attorneys researching this issue
have to fall back on direct inquiries to
local government offices or lesbian and
gay rights organizations that attempt to
maintain up-to-date lists. Perhaps the
'0 Cal. Lab. Code Sec. 1101,1102,1102.1(1992).
" N.J. Stat. Ann. Sec. 10:5-4 (1991).
'2 Vt. Stat. Ann. Til. 3, Sec. 961(6) (1992).
'3 Minn. Stat. Sec. 363.01-363.15 (1993).
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most reliable source for a reasonably upto-date list is the Lambda Legal Defense
and Education Fund, Inc.,''' a national
lesbian and gay rights public interest law
firm.
As of June 15, 1993, thirty-one of the
fifty largest cities by population had laws
banning discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation, with most applicable
to private sector employers. This included
seven of the ten largest cities; the three
largest cities without such laws are in
Texas. The seven cities are New York, Los
Angeles, Chicago, Philadelphia, San Diego, Detroit, and Phoenix. Other major
cities (from the top fifty by population)
with such laws include Atlanta, Austin,
Baltimore, Boston, Cincinnati, Columbus,
Denver, Honolulu, Kansas City (Missouri), Long Beach, Milwaukee, Minneapolis, New Orleans, Oakland, Philadelphia,
Pittsburgh, Portland (Oregon), Sacramento, San Francisco, San Jose, Seattle,
and Tucson.
Because of municipal and county ordinances, in some jurisdictions that lack
state sexual orientation discrimination
laws most citizens are covered by discrimination bans. In New York state, for example, ten cities (including New York
City, which comprises five counties) and
two counties, with a total population comprising well over half of the state's residents,
ban
sexual
orientation
discrimination in employment, with all
but a few of those policies applicable to
private sector employers.

However, as the court in Delaney observed, the 1992 amendment of the Labor
Code created protection against sexual
orientation discrimination outside the
purview of the Fair Employment and
Housing Code, so such protection remains
as a matter of state law in all those municipalities. Moreover, on August 17 the
California Supreme Court agreed to hear
an appeal in three consolidated cases,
under the name Runkle v. Superior Court,
from decisions by a San Francisco Superior Court judge dismissing complaints
under the San Francisco municipal
human rights law in reliance on Delaney.
Apparently, the California Supreme
Court will be addressing this issue after
all, and Delaney is not the last word on
the preemption issue.
If all state, county, and local laws and
policies are added together, it appears
that the number of United States residents either living in jurisdictions forbidding such discrimination or working in
jobs subject to such rules approaches half
the population. An exact figure is difficult
to determine, because some local laws also
apply to government contractors and may
have extraterritorial effect as a result.

What Does "Sexual Orientation"
Mean?

Freight^^ that the state's Fair Employment and Housing Code, which does not
cover sexual orientation, preempts the
seventeen municipal ordinances that deal
with this subject. The California Supreme
Court denied review of the case, giving it
the imprimatur of a state-wide precedent.

Although some of these laws use the
older nomenclature of "sexual preference"
or "affectional preference," almost all
laws on the subject now use the term
"sexual orientation" in describing the
characteristic as to which discrimination
is forbidden. Many of the laws define
"sexual orientation" to mean "homosexuality, bisexuality, or heterosexuality,"
without further explanation. Some laws,
reacting to specific concerns of legislators
responding to recent hot news items, also
specify certain people whom the laws are
not intended to protect. For example, the
Massachusetts law, enacted shortly after
a major FBI action against the North

'*666 Broadway, 12th Floor, New York, N.Y. 10012;
212-995-8585.

'5 14 Cal. App. 4th 590, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 33 (Ct.App.,
Mar. 24, 1993), rev. denied, 6/93.

In California, on the other hand, an
intermediate appellate court recently

ruled in Delaney v. Superior Fast

576

September, 1993 Labor Law Journal

American Man-Boy Love Association, a
pedophile organization, specifies that sexual orientation "shall not include persons
whose sexual orientation involves minor
children as the sex object," '^ The 1993
Minnesota law contains a similar express
exclusion from coverage,'^
The Minnesota law provides perhaps
the most detailed description of what coverage is intended: " 'Sexual orientation
means having or being perceived as having an emotional, physical, or sexual attachment to another person without
regard to the sex of that person or having
or being perceived as having an orientation for such attachment, or having or
being perceived as having a self-image or
identity not traditionally associated with
one's biological maleness or femaleness," '^ In fact, this definition goes beyond what a sexologist would consider to
be "sexual orientation" and appears possibly to include transvestism and transsexualism, characteristics that are distinct
from sexual orientation and are not normally considered to be covered by sex or
sexual orientation discrimination
It is important in thinking about the
scope of coverage of sexual orientation
laws to recognize the distinctions between
sexual orientation, core gender identity,
and gender role, as these terms are used
by scientists concerned with human sexuality, A good discussion of these concepts
in terms understandable by the lay reader
can be found in a useful book by Dr,
James Weinrich, Sexual Landscapes: Why
We Are What We Are, Why We Love
Whom We Love (1987), The brief summary that follows uses terminology and
concepts from Dr. Weinrich's book, A detailed review of the history and current
state of knowledge about human sexuality
can be fouhd in the first three chapters of
"' Mass, Gen, Laws, Ann, Ch, I51B, Sec, 4 (1989),
" Minn, Stat, Sec, 363,01(45) (1993),
'8 Minn, Stat, Sec, 363,01(45) (1993),
" See, e,g,, DeSantis v. Pacific Telephone, 608 F,2d 327
(9th Cir, 1979), and cases cited therein.
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Judge Richard Posner's recent book. Sex
and Reason (1992).
Core gender identity refers to the degree to which an individual's self-identity
is consonant with his or her biological
gender. The tiny proportion of the population which is "transposed" on the element
of core gender identity is sometimes labelled "transsexual," Transsexuality has
no necessary correlation with a particular
sexual orientation. Some transsexuals are
sexually attracted to members of the opposite sex, some to members of the same
sex.
Gender role refers to the degree to
which an individual is comfortable behaving and dressing in a manner that society
deems appropriate for his or her biological
gender. Someone who is "transposed" on
this element and desires to cross-dress is
called a "transvestite," Once again, there
is no necessary correlation between a
strong desire to cross-dress and sexual orientation. Many male transvestites who
prefer feminine or sexually-ambiguous
clothes are nonetheless heterosexual in orientation, as are many women who prefer
traditionally masculine clothes.
Finally, sexual orientation refers to the
direction or orientation of an individual's
erotic attraction and has no necessary correlation with a desire to cross-dress or to
assume the identity of the opposite gender
through sex-reassignment surgery. Everybody has a sexual orientation, and, as Dr,
Alfred Kinsey discovered in his wide-ranging research during the 1930s and
1940s,2° a surprisingly large percentage of
the adult population might be characterized by some degree of bisexuality in its
orientation, whether measured by sexual
fantasies or actual behavior.
Understanding of these concepts makes
clear that sexual orientation laws do not
^ Alfred C, Kinsey et al,. Sexual Behavior in the Human
Male (1948); Alfred C, Kinsey et al,. Sexual Behavior in the
Human Female (1953),

577

necessarily have any application to discrimination based on transvestism or
transsexualism (barring the unusual sort
of definition contained in the recent Minnesota law), and, by the same token, that
they are not solely intended to protect
lesbians and gay men from discrimination. Rather, sexual orientation laws are
intended to make sexual orientation
(whether heterosexual, bisexual, or homosexual) irrelevant to those employment
situations where having a particular sexual orientation is not a bona fide occupational qualification. Thus, in a jurisdiction
that fails to ban employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, a
heterosexual person who suffers discrimination because he is perceived to be gay
or bisexual would have no protection and
neither would a heterosexual who suffers
discrimination because he is not
Which Employers Are Covered?
Sexual orientation discrimination laws
also differ with respect to employer coverage. Sometimes, small firms are exempted
from coverage. Religious and religiously
affiliated institutions may claim varying
degrees of exemption based on constitutional free exercise of religion arguments
and express statutory exemptions. When
the Massachusetts Law Against Discrimination was amended to add "sexual orientation" in 1989, the legislature also
amended the law to provide a broad religious exemption applicable to all categories
of discrimination. While this was immediately responsive to political concerns in
gaining enactment of the law, it also may
reflect the prior Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court decision in Madsen v. Erwin^ which held that The Christian Science Monitor,
a church-affiliated
2' See, e.g., Konarski v. New York Medical College, 124
LC II 57,197 (N.Y. Sup.Ct., N.Y. Co. 1985), a f f d without
opinion, 513 N.Y.S.2d 905 (App. Div., 1st Dept. 1987), cert,
denied, 485 U.S. 905 (1988).
22 395 Mass. 7 1 5 , 4 8 1 N . E . 2d 1160 (1985).
23 Minn. Stat. Sec. 363.02(1X2) (1993).
'"' Blanding v. Sports Si Health Club, Inc., 373 N.W.2d
784 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985), affd without opinion, 389
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newspaper, was privileged by the First
Amendment to discharge a reporter after
discovering that she was a lesbian.
The Minnesota law provides a narrower
religious exemption limited to "a religious
or fraternal corporation, association, or
society, with respect to qualifications
based on religion or sexual orientation,
when religion or sexual orientation shall
be a bona fide occupational qualification
for employment." ^^
In neither Massachusetts nor Minnesota are purely secular employers entitled
to a constitutional exemption on grounds
of free exercise of religion. Indeed, in cases
arising under the Minneapolis civil rights
ordinance, the Minnesota courts have
made clear that secular employers are not
entitled to discriminate on the basis of
statutorily identified characteristics
merely because the secular employer (in
those cases, health clubs) has personal religious beliefs inimical to homosexuality.^^
However, in a housing discrimination
case, a California Court of Appeal has
ruled that a secular landlord may invoke
the free exercise of religion to deny housing to an unmarried heterosexual couple
based on the landlord's religious convictions, despite a state law barring marital
status discrimination in housing. The case
is on appeal to the California Supreme
Court.25
Even in those jurisdictions where sexual
orientation discrimination laws do not
provide express exemptions on religious
grounds, it is likely that they will be interpreted to require such exemptions for religious employers. The San Francisco
municipal ordinance was so interpreted in
1980, when a church discharged an organist on grounds of homosexuality.^^ The
N.W.2d 205 (Minn. 1986); Potter v. LaSalle Sports &
Health Club, 384 N.W.2d 873 (Minn. 1986).
2^ Donahue v. Fair Employment and Housing Commission, 1 Cal.App.4th 387, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 32 (Ct. App., 2nd
Dist. 1991), rev. granted, Feb. 27, 1992.
2* Walker v. First Presbyterian Church, 22 FEP 762 (Cal.
Super. Ct. 1980).
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New Jersey state law, which has religious
exemption language that is not ideally
clear, was challenged by the Orthodox
Presbyterian church shortly after enactment. The church contended that the ambiguous religious exemption might subject
it to burdensome litigation to establish its
right to discriminate on the basis of sexual
orientation in its employment and public
accommodation activities. Ruling on a request for a preliminary injunction against
the law taking effect, the federal district
court noted the state attorney general's
disavowal of any intent to enforce the law
against the church, suggesting that such
abstention by the state would be appropriate in light of free exercise concerns,
and denied temporary relief.^^ A similar
challenge to the Hawaii law was dismissed
as premature, because no enforcement actions had been brought against the religious employer.^
Another area of controversy in the employment of lesbians, gay men and bisexuals is jobs involving contact with children.
The Minnesota statute specifically exempts from coverage private "service organization[s] whose primary function is
providing occasional services to minors,
such as youth sports organizations, scouting organizations, boys' or girls' clubs,
programs providing friends, counselors, or
role models for minors, youth theater,
dance, music or artistic organizations, agricultural organizations for minors, and
other youth organizations, with respect to
qualifications of employees or volunteers
based on sexual orientation." ^^ This does
not mean that the state requires exclusion
of gays from such jobs, but rather that the
state will not intervene to protect gays
who are excluded.
A New Hampshire legislative proposal
to ban employment of lesbians and gay
men in child care facilities was held un2^ Presbytery of New Jersey of the Orthodox Presbyterian
Church V. Florio, No. 92-02641 (D.N.J. 1992) (not officially
published).
2* Voluntary Association v. Waihee, 800 F.Supp. 882
(D.Haw. 1992).
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constitutional by the New Hampshire Supreme Court, which found no rational
basis to support the role model theory on
which the legislation was premised.^" In
the same opinion, the court upheld a ban
on lesbians or gay men becoming adoptive
or foster parents. Thus, a court not inclined to be overly protective of the rights
of gay people was, nonetheless, persuaded
that lesbians and gay men presented no
particular danger to the welfare of children who would come into contact with
them in the context of "occasional services" rendered by "service organizations." The rationality of Minnesota's
exclusion is thus subject to question.
What is the Experience Under Sexual
Orientation Laws?
There are few reported court decisions
construing or applying laws banning discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Most of the reported decisions have
to do with claims by particular employers
that they are exempt from the laws. The
lack of officially published cases may be
due to several factors: first, that most of
the laws are too new to have generated a
significant body of appellate cases; second, that most of the laws are enforced by
administrative agencies that specialize in
mediating and resolving discrimination
charges short of litigation and those agencies frequently achieve settlements satisfactory to the parties; third, that officials
responsible for selecting court decisions
for publication are occasionally squeamish
about lesbian and gay issues and avoid
selecting such cases for publication.
(A surprising number of significant decisions on gay issues are not officially published, especially in jurisdictions where
trial court decisions, if published, are done
so on a highly selective basis, such as New
York and California. Squeamishness may
be the explanation for lack of official pub29 Minn. Stat. Sec. 363.02(0(3) (1993).
3° Opinion of the Justices, 525 A.2d 1095 (N.H. 1987).
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lication in Dillon v. Frank,^^ an important
case of first impression on the appellate
level concerning workplace harassment of
employees perceived as gay,)
In addition, many lesbians and gay
men who encounter workplace discrimination may not file charges because they are
not fully "out of the closet" and fear the
possible notoriety of litigation. While
some jurisdictions allow such complainants to proceed on an anonymous basis,
some others do not, which can be a significant deterrent for those who wish to avoid
future discrimination by concealing their
sexual orientation from potential employers and coworkers.

and bisexual employees. Public employees
may also have constitutional and civil service protection. Union-represented employees may find protection under
collective bargaining agreements. Marital
status discrimination laws in many jurisdictions may also apply to certain situations where unmarried lesbian and gay
employees encounter unequal treatment.
Public employment was one of the first
areas where courts began to develop a
theoretical basis for protection against
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Just days after the Stonewall
Rebellion in New York City that
launched the modern lesbian and gay libPerhaps the most noteworthy discrimi- eration movement in June 1969, the
nation ruling under a sexual orientation United States Court of Appeals for the
law is the case of Collins v. Shell Oil District of Columbia Circuit ruled in NorCompany,^^ brought under Section 1101 ton V. Macy ^^ that the due process clause
of the California Labor Code, Jeffrey Col- was offended when a federal agency dislins was a respected executive at Shell Oil charged a closeted gay employee who had
Company, He was discharged after a sec- been arrested for sexual solicitation while
retarial employee found a sheet of paper off duty.
Collins had left in a photocopying maThe employee, a military veteran emchine, describing the rules for a "safe sex" ployed as a budget analyst by the Naparty he was planning to host with some tional
Aeronautics
and
Space
friends. The trial judge found that holding Administration, was discharged on two
such a party was a form of political activ- grounds: that the conduct leading to his
ity within the meaning of Section 1101 as arrest was "immoral, indecent, and disconstrued by the California Supreme graceful" and that his admission of past
Court in the Gay Law Students case, and homosexual conduct indicated that he had
assessed compensatory and punitive dam- "traits of character and personality which
ages against the employer in the amount render him , ,, unsuitable for further govof approximately $5 million. The pending ernment employment," The court held
case of Smedley v. Capps, Staples, Ward, that the agency bore the burden of showHastings & Dodson, discussed at the be- ing that the employee's conduct had some
ginning of this article, will give the Cali- rational relationship to his fitness for serfornia courts an opportunity to clarify vice and that mere assertions of moral
further the extent of employee activity disapproval were insufficient for this purprotected under Section 1101,
pose. The decision, accompanied by several others over the next few years,
Other Sources of Workplace
eventually led to reconsideration of fedProtection
eral government policies, resulting in
Sexual orientation discrimination laws adoption of the view that homosexuality,
are not the only source of protection as such, was not a barrier to civilian govagainst discrimination for lesbian, gay. ernment service. This was confirmed as
" 58 EPD II 41,332 (6th Cir, 1992),
3257 EPD 1140,907, 1991 WL 147364 (Cal,Super,Ct,,
1991),

"417F,2d 1161 (DCCir, 1969),
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mandatory in 1987, when a federal court
ruled in Swift v. United States^* that
exclusion of civilians from federal service
solely on the basis of sexual orientation,
without any job-related justification, also
violated the equal protection requirement
of the 5th Amendment,
In 1992, the Department of Housing
and Urban Development concluded a collective bargaining agreement that included a ban on anti-gay discrimination
within the agency, and similar bans were
adopted administratively by the Secretaries of Agriculture and Transportation
early in the Clinton Administration.
Federal employment in the non-civilian
sector has proven a more difficult constitutional issue. In the wake of Bowers v.
Hardwick, many federal courts have
taken the view that deferral to the concerns of military and security agencies
(FBI, CIA, NSA) is the appropriate
course, rejecting a variety of constitutional challenges to the exclusion of gays
from employment in those institutions. As
political leaders debated whether and how
to implement President Clinton's pledge
to remove the ban on service by openly
gay people in the military during 1993,
several court challenges were in progress,
including a case in which the Supreme
Court refused to review a decision by the
Ninth Circuit that would require the Defense Department at trial to provide a
better justification for its ban than the
one it had been providing, i.e., that gays
could not serve because non-gay troops
would not tolerate them,^^ Some doubt
was cast on this ruling, however, by the
Court's end-of-term decision in St. Mary's
Honor Center v.

ing agreements. Arbitrators have normally applied the well established rule
that conduct off the job, such as homosexual conduct, cannot constitute just cause
for discharge unless the employer can
prove a significant adverse impact on its
business by retention of the employee.
Thus, where a male airline flight attendant was charged with improper sexual advances to a young male employee at a
hotel where the flight crew was staying,
the arbitrator ordered reinstatement because the airline failed to show that continued employment of the now-repentant
employee would damage its business in
any way,^'' Similarly, an arbitrator found
no cause for discharge of a grocery clerk
for taking part in a lesbian party during
off-hours.-'®

Labor arbitrators have occasionally had
to rule on claims of unjust dismissal
brought by gay employees under typical
just-cause provisions of collective bargain-

About twenty states ban employment
discrimination on the basis of marital status. While marital status and sexual orientation discrimination claims are
conceptually quite distinct, the ban on
same-sex marriage maintained by all the
states means that any policy denying benefits to unmarried employees with samesex partners who live in emotionally and
financially interdependent relationships
similar to married employees may be subject to challenge on grounds of marital
status discrimination. While such claims
have not been uniformly successful, they
are being made with increasing fervor,
and at least one appellate court has concluded that they are plausible claims deserving of a full airing at trial. In Gay
Teachers Association v. New York City
Board of Education,^^ the court accepted
the argument that the plaintiffs, protesting the ineligibility of their domestic
partners for inclusion on the school system's employee benefit plans on the same
basis as employee spouses, had stated a
valid cause of action under a state law

^ 42 FEP 787 (D,D,C, 1987),
35 Pruitt V. Cheney, 943 F,2d 989 (9th Cir, 1991), cert,
denied, 113 S,Ct, 655 (1992),
3^ No, 92-602, 1993 Westlaw 220265 (U,S,, June 25,
1993),

3' Hughes Air Corporation & Association of Flight Attendants, 73 LA 148 (Barsamian, Arb,, 1979),
38 Ralphs Grocery Co. & Retail Clerks Union, 77 LA 867
(Kaufman, Arb,, 1981),
3» 585 N,Y,S,2d 1016 (App,Div,, 1st Dept, 1992),
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forbidding marital status discrimination
and a city ordinance forbidding both marital status and sexual orientation discrimination. Private sector employers are
probably immune from such suits because
of preemption of state and local civil
rights statutes by the federal pension and
benefits laws (which do not apply to public sector employee benefit plans), but
proposals floating around Congress to
tinker with the preemption provisions
may open up this new field for litigation
in the future.
Although Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 ^ does not cover sexual orientation, either expressly or by interpretation, several courts have accepted the
view that same-sex sexual harassment is
actionable under the quid pro quo theory,'*' Under this theory, both gay and
non-gay employees who suffer unwanted
sexual advances from other employees or
supervisors may find legal protection. On
the other hand, federal courts have refused to extend the hostile environment
theory of sexual harassment under Title
VII to situations in which employees suffer such harassment because they are perceived to be gay,'*^ The courts have
reasoned that the quid pro quo theory
proceeds on the ground that the employee
was harassed because of his or her gender,
while the hostile environment theory fails
to proceed because the harassment is due
to sexual orientation rather than gender.
Of course, if gay employees suffer discrimination because they are perceived as
having AIDS, being at risk for AIDS, or
associating with persons with AIDS, they
may seek protection under the Americans
With Disabilities Act (ADA) *^ and similar state laws. As its express language,
legislative history and interpretive regulations make clear, the ADA was not intended to ban discrimination on the basis
*" 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e (1991).
•" Joyner v. AAA Cooper Transportation. 597 F.Supp. 537
(M.D.Ala. 1983), affirmed without published opinion, 749
F.2d 732 (Uth Cir, 1984); Wright v. Methodist Youth
Services. 511 F.Supp, 307 (N,D.I11. 1981).
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of sexual orientation, per se, but if AIDS
is a motivation for discrimination, the discriminatee is protected, regardless of his
or her sexual orientation.
Apart from constitutional or statutory
causes of action, lesbian and gay employees may also be protected by voluntarily
adopted employer non-discrimination policies, contained in work place rules, personnel manuals and employee handbooks
which, in many states, are treated as part
of an enforceable contract of employment.
Such policies first began to be adopted by
major corporations in the 1970s in response to surveys of large companies undertaken by the National Gay and
Lesbian Task Force, Many more such policies were adopted during the 1980s by
employers determined to show support for
employees battling the AIDS epidemic or
responding to the recommendations of
professional societies or accrediting organizations. For example, early in the 1990s
many law schools adopted non-discrimination policies in response to adoption of a
non-discrimination by-law by the Association of American Law Schools, In some
cases, the policies were accompanied by
voluntary recognition of employees' domestic partners for purposes of benefits
entitlements. While some of these policies
were not legally binding, they created an
atmosphere in which employee complaints
of discrimination might be taken seriously
by company managers, even in the absence of legal intervention.
Conclusion
Over the past quarter century, the law
has taken great strides in extending protection against discrimination in employment to lesbians and gay men, a group
totally bereft of legal recognition at the
beginning of this period. While comprehensive federal coverage does not yet exist, the debate on service by gays in the
"2 Dillon V. Frank. 952 F,2d 403 (table), 58 EPD H 41,332
(6th Cir. 1992); Carreno v. Local 2261.B.E.W.. 54 FEP 81
(D. Kan. 1990).
"3 42 U.S.C. Sec. 12101-12213 (1990).
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military suggests that the time is soon
coming when there will be a national consensus to forbid sexual orientation discrimination, at least in civilian
employment. This conclusion arises from
the tenor of the debate, in which even
many conservative commentators agree
that sexual orientation discrimination in
employment is wrong, but contend that
the special circumstances of the military
make it justifiable in that sphere.
Meanwhile, a large minority of the population either lives in states or localities
where sexual orientation discrimination is

unlawful or works for employers bound by
express or implicit policies of non-discrimination, imposed either by constitutional
mandate, administrative fiat, or well-established policy. At the rate new sexual
orientation laws are being enacted by
states and localities, it seems that coverage of a majority of employers is not far
off, so this is an issue as to which labor
relations practitioners need to be wellinformed,
[The End]

Jury Award Reduced in ADA Suit
A jury award of $572,000 in the EEOC's first lawsuit under Title I of the
Americans with Disabilities Act was reduced to $222,000 by the federal
district court in Chicago, Statutory caps on compensatory and punitive damages required the reduction (EEOC v. AIC Security Investigations, Ltd., 61
EPD If 42,289), The defendant violated the ADA by firing an employee
because he had terminal brain cancer, despite the fact that he was still able to
perform the essential functions of the job at the time of the firing. The EEOC
unsuccessfully sought to have the $200,000 cap applied separately to the
compensatory and punitive awards, but the court ruled that the statute
applies the cap to both awards combined.
The EEOC also argued unsuccessfully that the cap applies only to
businesses, not to business owners sued as individuals. The court rejected the
defendant's argument that the $50,000 compensatory award was excessive.
However, the award of $500,000 for punitive damage was excessive, the court
ruled, lowering it to $150,000 and bringing the combined awards to the
statutory limit of $200,000 (the statute prohibits informing juries of the limit
in order to avoid influencing their deliberations). The award of $22,000 in
back pay was not affected by the cap.
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